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POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1944

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CONTENTS

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Briefs
Josef Plojhar Dies 1

POLAND

- Taped Walesa Statements, Worker Reaction
(LISTY, Aug 81) 2

ROMANIA

- Communists Ethics, Social Practice Examined
(Constantin Raducu; CONTEMPORANUL, 16 Oct 81) 11

YUGOSLAVIA

- Historical Survey of Albanian Settlement in Yugoslavia
(Viktor Meier; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 22 Oct 81) 14
- Milovan Djilas Cites Emigre Threats Against His Son
(Christine von Khol; DIE PRESSE, 2 Nov 81) 23

BRIEFS

JOSEF PLOJHAR DIES--The Honorary Chairman, Czechoslovak People's Party and Deputy, Chamber of People, Federal Assembly, Josef Plojhar died suddenly on 5 November at the age of 79. [Prague PRACE in Czech 7 Nov 81 p 1]

CSO: 2400/58

TAPED WALESA STATEMENTS, WORKER REACTION

Rome LISTY in Czech No 5, Aug 81 pp 30-33

[Tape Recording of Lech Walesa's Remarks At the Warsaw Iron Works, 27 March 1981--
Translated by Ela Ledererova]

[Text] It was Friday, 27 March 1981. From 0800 until 12.00, there was a warning strike throughout Poland, in response to the Bydgoszcz incident in which the Polish police seriously wounded three officials of the Solidarity trade union. The warning strike was intended to force the government to come to an agreement with Solidarity representatives. It had been decided that if such an agreement is not reached, Solidarity would on 31 March declare a general strike without any time limit.

These were the worst and most dangerous days since last August. Days full of general tension and impatient expectation. People were living from day to day, hour to hour. The threat of Soviet military intervention loomed over Poland.

During the hours of the general strike, Lech Walesa visited some of the large enterprises. Everywhere, he called for determination but also deliberation. His words were spontaneous without prior preparation.

Our recording is from the meeting in the Warsaw Iron Works which was Walesa's fourth stop that day. The tape can obviously not capture the atmosphere of tension and determination. Rather than a church-like silence, there was constant commotion. Only in moments of extraordinary seriousness when the workers' leader spoke of the principal problems of the day, did the crowd settle down, only to burst into laughter or applause soon thereafter.

The meeting ended exactly at noon, at the time when the 4-hour warning strike was coming to a close. As a last act, the assembled workers sang the Polish national anthem.

In order to illustrate the substance of the proceedings and the mood of the audience, we add three worker contributions. These were exciting words which attest to the basic stance of the Polish workers during these decisive moments in contemporary Polish history.

Lech Walesa:

"We did not say goodbye the last time I was here; therefore, we need no welcoming ceremonies now. We are still the same. We are meeting at a difficult time, in a precarious situation which must be well understood. You know that in 1970, without any special knowledge or training, I led the strike in a shipyard. Since then you and I have learned many things. In 1956, 1970, and 1976, we made mistakes which we must not repeat right now at this particular moment. If we gave in now, if we only continued to reform the old way, everything would be the same. Obviously, we must act with deliberation. We must not allow ourselves to be provoked, since provocation already exists. What's more, they are firing at our functionaries. Consequently, we must be very careful, very cautious, and not let ourselves be provoked. Naturally, the people who are being removed from office and will continue to be removed, will do everything possible to drag us into a fight which we do not want. You must demand that we, functionaries avoid endangering people, seek deliberate ways without retreating. The proposal we heard at the last all-state commission meeting was staggering, for it meant an immediate general strike. I did not agree with it, and someone may perhaps accuse me of being wrong. I believe we functionaries must not proceed in this manner. We were not ready for a frontal confrontation and the struggle cannot be waged without preparation. We do not want to subvert the government, the party, our alliances, or socialism. If we had driven the situation to the point of a knife, it would have been risky, and I don't know whether we would be meeting here today at all.

"Even the world has come to understand that we, in fact, do not desire to strike at all. We know that the strike hurts us most of all. Look, I go through the city, I observe what is happening, the waiting lines are longer and longer. The fact is, however, that today we cannot act differently. We have made mistakes in the past, especially in 1970, when we again trusted because they told us 'trust us and we will make improvements.' But we know that those plans of theirs for renovation can hardly bring nothing, at least not for 5 years--because from now on events will move faster, we will be in a very difficult situation, we will really be threatened by revolution, but the kind in which we will destroy each other. For in 5 years no one will trust anybody, not even the church which has joined in the events, or a crafty fellow like me and others. People will say 'they were too soft and what did it bring us, what have they accomplished.' We will smash heads, fight, and this is not what we are all about.

"We already have an almost complete victory. It is only a question of making secure that which we have achieved. Naturally, some say that this should have been done as early as last August, or on another occasion, or even during the first memorable strike. I believe that this would have been a mistake. We had to wait until everything was ripe. Look, at that time in August, no group, be it party, parliamentary, or municipal, was supporting us. And what is happening now? Entire regions, Gdansk, Bydgosc, entire organizations support us and claim that it was all a mistake, that there are violations of law in our country, and that this must be done away with.

"Thus, it was necessary to settle strikes and prevent actions which would have made us go too far. Even what has happened now was something I proposed should wait at least a month, but events showed otherwise.

"We must view the problems a bit differently and maintain a certain direction in basic policy. Obviously, we are not naive. You know that some time ago, I also said 'we will help.' Two years later I was without job, arrested, in jail, etc. This time, we denounced illegality, while not attacking any organization, not even the party, as a whole; not even the security forces as such, because every country needs security, even state security, and other officials. We have attacked illegality, violations of laws, and individuals who are guilty of such violations. This is what we are against and we must act accordingly.

"Naturally, many people don't like it and they will fight against us. They thought they could sign any number of agreements, that we would allow ourselves to be fooled, that our enthusiasm would ebb, and that we would return to their innovation, that everything would be as before. Now they see that this will not come about. So, we will catch one regional boss after another, just as we would catch rats. They will have to go, they will no longer steal from us, deceive us, they will no longer be allowed to call us antisocialists. They are the antisocialists, they are the ones who led this country into bankruptcy.

"For few people really knew how bad the situation was. Even parliamentary deputies and some highly placed people did not know what kind of morass we found ourselves in. By now they have found out, today they know that private farmers unions are necessary. They know by now that we do not need graduates of 2-year courses, but rather really knowledgeable, openminded people.

"I don't want to digress. This is my fourth meeting today and I don't know if I have told you everything. I would like to tell you many things so that you can understand me. The struggle is hard, difficult, and under no circumstances must we allow ourselves to be divided. At the same time, we must remember that we need prudence. There are functionaries who think that everything can be had immediately, that all we have to do is to demand and the opponent will collapse. They are among you, I know some of those who would like to solve problems in this manner. Well, that will not do, we are responsible Poles, we must remember that this country is our Poland, we must not destroy anything, not a single broken window pane, because it is we who pay for the damage, not the minister, we do. I am also opposed to exchanging one thief for another. We should set up cells within our organization which would make sure that no one is enriching himself at our expense. Such cells must appear where there are cases of individuals living off other people and stealing from them. Even when such an individual leaves his position, we should find out what he owns, and if it is too much, tell him that he has a choice of either contributing to the union or to the poor. It is precisely in such a situation that a game of musical chairs begins. You remove one man from office, they then transfer him to us, while our villain goes elsewhere. What does this lead to? The problem is to eliminate the root causes of this process through which they deceive us and, after a time, return to the same old ways. This is what we have to think about.

"At the same time, we must remember that it is not certain how it will end. Judging by what has already been achieved, we can hope that it will end well. But let us

not forget the provocations. Let us remember that we must avoid them and that we must stand together, against opinions demanding that we be tougher and others that we be more moderate. Despite this, let us stand together or else we will lose. And if we lose, we solve no problems and things will get tougher. If we can now describe the score as one all, it will then be two to one against us. They will watch us so that we cannot rise again. And even if we managed that, we would not trust one another. There are some countries where when two people talk and a third one approaches, the two speakers fall silent in fear of a witness, an informant, and such. We will not allow such a situation to arise here, but let us remember that if we must pay, we will pay with honor, for we have no other choice. I hope it will not come to that because things are beginning to shape up somewhat differently. Obviously, at this moment we will not achieve 100 percent, but we will not retreat on the most important issues, because retreat is out of question.

"So much for that. Perhaps there will be some questions, but I am tired, this is my fourth assembly, as I have already told you. Perhaps I repeated myself and did not speak well. I would like to explain certain urgent problems which concern my person. There are some who try to trip me up. I would like the opportunity to look in their eyes. I have nothing to hide and if you have doubts, that is your privilege. I will say only one thing, we functionaries have no right to place you people in jeopardy. We must seek ways which would be least costly to you. You gave us your trust and it is our duty to fight, but we must first inform you on the situation and let you decide. Let us consult together and choose the way together. We shall not retreat. That is the way I see the problems, others see them differently. There are different opinions. Now, please, the questions."

We selected from the discussions some of Lech Walesa's replies. He spoke of the attack of Solidarity officials in Pulawy, which is being investigated by the police. "We cannot be surprised, there are people who really have a lot on their conscience. They are not very comfortable at this time because all their dirty dealings are coming to the surface, and they are defending themselves. We must proceed step by step, bring down the pillars, make a small opening and enlarge it more and more. Up to a certain point, we have succeeded in this. The Bydgoszcz situation, however, has forced us to enter the worst, most difficult phase. August was not so terrible. Even those who signed were thinking 'All right, we will sign and tomorrow we will liquidate you.'"

L.W. speaks of his positions and addresses his critics: "Some thought that I have lost ground, that I estranged myself from the people. No, I have not done this, but you cannot break down a wall by banging your head against it. I do what I do in order not to endanger the people who trust me. For it is easy to shout 'let us march!' But what will happen then? We will lose our women and children. And why should we act like that when we can win without the slightest losses. So far, we are winning. And people agree with me, while others are achieving quite the opposite effect. For example, the first speech of Deputy Rakowski evoked the opposite effect. I told him afterwards: 'Mr Deputy, you read a prepared speech in which you attacked us. I am only a worker and was not prepared; therefore, it was not very polished.' But I had to react to the salient points of his speech. And apparently I replied well enough (applause) and I didn't wait until the following day as they do."

L.W. describes his cooperation with his advisers: "Some would like to drive a wedge between me and those who counsel me. Educated people have a lot to say but we cannot follow their advice in everything. However, I need them and their diverse opinions which help us. Obviously, they cannot rule us. Others are trying to drive a wedge between those who are advising the primate and who are honorable people and want nothing from us. We do not pay them anything. Advisors are useful but they cannot make the final decisions."

L.W. gives his views on workers self-government: "Let us remember that workers self-government, workers councils, are not the same as trade unions. As Poles and trade unionists we can, of course, send the best people into them. But as trade unionists we are not rushing blindly into responsible positions, into sharing in decisions and management. This is not our cause. In this respect, we would be making the same mistake as in 1956. We would again climb somebody's back and that somebody would pretend that we made the decisions and went against policy. Let self-government make sure that there is maximum production at minimum cost, but trade unions will continue voicing demands, albeit prudently. Naturally, if the plan is fulfilled 150 percent, we want 50 percent higher wages. It is in this manner that we will fight for what is ours. For example, a machine is delivered to the factory, we paid for it and it is already producing. It replaced three people, consequently, we want money for two. We will continue presenting demands, but when someone tells us that there are no resources left, we will take that into consideration. But trade unions are here exclusively for the protection of the workers, not sharing in decisionmaking and management. Let the workers bear responsibility through the self-management system, but not in the unions which are a different matter altogether. Let us not make the same mistake again! That mistake has cost us enough in the past. Therefore, let us this time preserve the independence of the trade union, independence from the church, as well as others. Let us keep our advisers, our hearts, and our conscience. We, ourselves know best what we should do. They can help us but no one will supervise us." (applause)

L.W. on the meeting between Premier Jaruzelski and Primate Wyszyński: "The situation is rather dramatic. We know that the antisocialists are pressing us at home and, in order to preserve their troughs, they would also like to invite someone. The conversation between the premier and the primate was private; therefore, it is difficult to say anything. You all know the communique. One must know how to read such communiques. They certainly talked about all sorts of things but one of these clearly emerges. We are capable of solving our problems ourselves, without help. We are not threatening anyone, not the party, not the system. We only wish to see slogans become reality. We want to live and work. The primate undoubtedly wished the same. As you surely know, I cooperate very closely with the primate, we know each other quite well; consequently, he knows what I think, what I want, what we want. He said he will always be with us. And he will be. After all, even the Holy Father is informed and watches over us. Therefore, we believe that we can avoid all pitfalls. The primate touched upon all the important questions, everything we can imagine. The conversation lasted 15 minutes less than 4 hours, that should be enough. So, we believe that there will be understanding, that we can avoid the tragedy with which they threaten us. They threaten us also to force us into retreat, so that they can do the same things again. For this reason, we will not retreat and we will win, but we must act prudently and we must not allow ourselves to be provoked. Even if there should be shooting, even if one of us dies,

we must go on. We surely find that or another gangster. But we must not immediately go into the streets, into an open fight, because then we would be finished. We cannot attack the entire security apparatus, not everyone in security is bad, there are voices even there saying they would like a Solidarity and other things. Even there we find people of different opinions."

L.W. on being awarded a foreign prize: "I don't want any prizes. You know well that the prize will be given to Solidarity. We will be richer. I did not come into the trade unions for prizes or anything else. Eleven thousand dollars, that is something. Maybe we will build something with it, or buy something, perhaps grain or bread. (applause) In some other country they also awarded a prize for a photograph of the year. We will be even richer. I hope we have time to spend it all. (applause) I came into the trade unions with nothing and I will leave the same way."

L.W. on the workers' strike: "Kuwaj sits here with us because we are close to the peasants. We are in one delegation. The peasants must have their trade union. If there is a strike, they will join us with a small group. We will be striking and they will be bringing us food, they will sow, harvest and husband resources so that we have something to live on."

L.W. on the question of whether Solidarity's work has a political character: "This is difficult to say. When we demand the replacement of a regional administrator or secretary who is a criminal, it is difficult to say whether this is a political matter. Obviously, when someone ignores the facts, he will say that it is indeed a political matter because Solidarity wants its own man in that position. But when we know that it is not a question of a secretary but of Mr X who is a criminal, then it is not a political matter but one of removing a criminal. Or it can be an individual who no longer enjoys the confidence of society and should not be occupying a certain position. We will not say that we are removing a secretary but a Mr X who has such and such things on his conscience. We are striking against the building of new police stations and they hold this against us. But we can say, look, we want the same amount or even more money for hospitals at the same time. Then they could not say that ours is an attack against police stations which started sprouting up like mushrooms at the cost of millions."

L.W. on a question of whether he had suffered moments of depression during the long negotiations with the government delegation: "No, I never collapsed, not even when I learned that my wife was in the hospital. I had made up my mind that I would not retreat no matter what, even if they decided to chop me up into little pieces. However, I was also determined to be prudent and not smash my head against a wall. But I would not retreat. (applause) Since I am a religious believer and have, for a long time, held firm convictions stemming from past experiences, that is my character. Perhaps it's a deviation, perhaps a disease, but such is my character."

L.W. replies to a question on what will happen with Gierk and Jaroszewicz, and others: "We shouted at them too much and they became sick. And sick people cannot(laughter, applause) If we rise up organizationally, we will tell these gentlemen 'you did not want to give us free Saturdays, so we will not give them to you either. We will give a sidewalk to each of you to take care of, you will work according to how much you have on your conscience. We will not feed you for free. Later, you will return to normal life but you will no longer be officials because you have not been rehabilitated.'" (applause, laughter)

L.W. responds to a question on whether it was not a mistake to announce the date of the general strike ahead of time: "It was not, it is a matter of psychology. Let someone's knees tremble in his pants. We are prepared in any case, even though some say that it is not precisely psychological, that we are destroying people, that such long preparations are not good. We are in principle for fair play, we are prepared to stop events, as well as set them in motion. We are prepared to wait. Even world public opinion lauds our prudence. We are giving them time--go ahead, get ready, talk it out among yourselves, collect competent people, and then sit down at a table. This method is logical and correct. We are guarantors. Because even after nonaggression pacts and similar things, we can still get a knife in the back. For this reason, it is essential that our stance, organization, its flexibility and solidarity be good. If they are, we will achieve everything. Whether it happens tomorrow or the day after is not important. The decisive thing is that we are not resigning, that we maintain prudence, and that we avoid tearing everything down and setting the torch to it. Obviously, we will continue replacing officials until such time as the right people occupy the right positions.

L.W. explains the position of Premier Jaruzelski and his views of Solidarity: "Based on a private conversation which I cannot publicize, I came to the conclusion --and you will too--that this is one man in uniform who can be trusted a little. Despite the fact that there is an overall lack of trust in this country, this type of soldier had it. Naturally, we cannot say 'We trust you 100 percent.' No, we are giving you a chance. We do not want to make you nervous, Mr Prime Minister, just go about your work, tell us who stands in the way and we will take care of it. You will not dirty your hands. (laughter) Of course, this is not an indication that we wish to help you remove the people who do not want to change, those who have reformed themselves four times already and always remained the same. Same as chameleons, once green, then red again. We want you to understand that we do not wish to subvert the party, nor do we want to become a party, we do not wish to be in the way or cause commotion. But we do want to pull of their seats those who hinder you and us. I believe that the premier will do it, he has already taken the first steps, however he lacks the strength, as I do. I know about those who try to trip me up and do things to spite me. These are people placed among us--perhaps not among you--but in the leadership of our unions, there are people who are paid provocateurs. I cannot get rid of them, they engage in popular politics, because he who shouts louder, appears bolder. In a struggle we need courage, but there is also a time for prudence when we cannot allow ourselves to be placed in jeopardy, when there is need for compromise and planning.

"We fear only God. If we lose, we will lose our heads in any event. But as long as we have them, let us use them to achieve the maximum. How often have they threatened me. I was to perish yesterday and I did not. In Gdansk they told me to get some protection, to be careful. We obeyed, but that is not the point. When I am in a crowd, any fanatic "volunteer" can stick a knife in me. They begged me to have at least minimum security, so we obeyed. I don't believe in it, I am a fatalist, but I obviously don't stick my head under a streetcar. I am not overly worried. The government did not intimidate me. I have no fear and I will march as I have marched before. They tried to intimidate me earlier but I did not retreat and will not do so because that is my only choice. If I should ever retreat, they would liquidate me immediately."

L.W. on the question of martial law: "This not an idle threat, it is possible. If the provocateurs drag us into a fight, people will become angry, and well march on the police station, especially if someone is killed. Then we may have a situation when we will be against each other. Then it would be salvation if they pulled us apart. We will fight so fiercely that a third party could divide us. Therefore, should fighting ever break out, let us return to our plants. It is bad, one of us has already paid, and we will find them. But it is not possible to allow it to go to full confrontation because then we would lose. We would lose and pay dearly. Therefore, we need caution and prudence. Let us not retreat, but let us be the ones to choose the place of the battle. Not in the streets where they are stronger, not at the police stations where they are also stronger, but rather in our plants. There we will wait, wait even with those pipes in hand. (applause)

"Today is really the time for national reconciliation, for a common road. If we quarrel, if we seek conflict among ourselves, it will not be good and we will achieve nothing. Let us forgive each other today, really forgive. It is a historical landmark, a historic moment for us all. If we make good use of it, Poland will again be Poland. If we don't, we will be beaten cruelly, in a manner our children will not forgive because victory was within reach and we were unable to dot the 'i.' Consequently, let us make that dot and everything will go well. It must go well, because otherwise we will be running away from here as fast as we can."

Several workers at the meeting, men and women, presented their contributions. We have picked the following:

A woman worker: "The government is not one with the working class, if it were, they would tell us the truth. They say nothing. All along they have been deceiving us, so let them make a decision, let them stop threatening us with fratricidal war. They are the ones who declared war on us even before the strike."

Another woman worker: "First of all, why are they extending the Soyuz 81, the maneuvers? When the situation in Poland is so terribly tragic that we have nothing to eat, we are supposed to feed whole armies? For them there is food and for us there is none? And only the strikes are supposed to be the reason that there is nothing to eat, because there is a strike and was a strike, this is the reason that there is not even some miserable mustard in Warsaw? There is no soap, no detergent, there is nothing. This was caused by the strikes? More likely, the strikes saved us. If there hadn't been 1980, if the shipyard workers had not gone on strike, there would have been a horrible fratricidal war in January because there would have been nothing to eat. Only the strikes held the workers back from going in the streets and fighting each other. Let's assume there is no strike. The government punishes a few people but the food will still be stashed away. We all believe that this is all being done on purpose. It is impossible for Poland to be so poor. As late as July, they were shouting that we do not drink enough milk in Poland. When did the milk disappear? Now people get one liter of milk, small children have nothing to eat. The older children are given bread by the mother, maybe a little butter and sugar, because she has nothing else. And all this after 35 years of hard work by the people? They told us, comrades, help us, give to us! People worked, party meetings were held, there were brigades, voluntary and involuntary. Day after day, the men worked, the women never saw them, and now the wife says 'you lazy bum, you have worked for so many years, what exactly did you do?' So that we

can go hungry? All this talk about the strikes leading us into bankruptcy is just a pretext, just silly prattling. No doubt, some percentage of loss is there. But we have only one weapon--strikes, because no one wants to listen to us. In the *EXPRES WJECZORNY*, they printed a beautiful conversation. Some professor was saying that for the government it was a surprise that the worker finally raised his head and, as we say, will never bow it again. And he will not, that is a fact. Let them murder 36 million people! We have nothing to lose and, at this moment, none of us will retreat. There is unity and strength in Solidarity. We will not allow ourselves to be humiliated. Everyone is supporting us and we will not retreat. I also have children, and when I was leaving home, I told them that no one knows what the government may come up with. I told them that I was going to work but that I may not come back if the tanks appear. And if I have to stay here a month, so I will stay, even without knowing what is happening at home. I will not retreat. Because if we retreat, they will start dragging us from our homes like rats and they will murder us. It started in Bydgoszcz and it will end up the same way in every town. If we retreat, it will mean our defeat because, at that moment, the Polish worker and Poland will cease to exist."

9596

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COMMUNISTS ETHICS, SOCIAL PRACTICE EXAMINED

Bucharest CONTEMPORANUL in Romanian 16 Oct 81 p 3

[Article by Dr Constantin Raducu]

[Text] Man, as a creative subject who is active in the revolutionary transformation of society, thinks and acts in close connection with the laws of social-historical determinism. However, not being a mechanical product of the laws of determinism, man judges and evaluates critically, selectively the values, including moral ones, and makes his choices consciously and responsibly with the prospect of fulfilling certain interests, goals and ideals. At the same time, the real values of socialist morals are totally opposed to the specific manifestations of voluntarism, subjectivism and individualism. As Lenin wrote, "Morals serves human society in order to raise higher and to become liberated from the exploitation of work."

Integrated into the party program, the code of communist ethics promotes honesty, modesty, correctness, collaboration and mutual help, solidarity, friendship, humanism, courage, a spirit of initiative and constructive boldness and responsibility for the communist evolution of the country.

As Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu emphasizes, at the basis of educational activity are "the communist principles on life, considering that they are one of the basic duties of our party toward society. These principles mean social equity and justice, humanism, respect for and concern with man and with raising his material and spiritual well-being and, of course, they also mean combatting certain negative manifestations, certain mentalities which conceive of man as a means of exploitation." In conformity with the principles and standards of socialist ethics and equity, it is necessary consistently to promote a critical spirit in general and self-critical in particular, intransigence toward shortcomings and to take decisive action against inertia, routine, conservatism, self-thanks, egoism and individualism, favoritism, negativism, self seeking, old mentalities of a bourgeois or petit bourgeois nature and customs and habits which bear the imprint of bourgeois life, of the tendencies of some to get rich illegally, without working, and to gain public goods, that is, against everything which in one way or another harms the principles of our society.

The organic assimilation of a revolutionary ideology and of scientific socialism at the level of our entire society, the growth in the contribution to its creative development are the constitutional and formational nucleus, the theoretical basis for a socialist moral-political awareness. The principles of communist morals are subject to a permanent renewal in accordance with each historical stage. As a phenomenon of awareness, morals involves, along with the emotional aspects, also the volitional and those depending on knowledge; there is an indissoluble link between the elements of morals and the scientific ones. For that reason, Marxism combats neopositivist

theories which reduce morals to emotions or to an analysis of ethical concepts just as any theory which promotes hypocrisy and falseness, moral liberalism, bigotry or moral-religious fanaticism.

Mastering the principles and standards of socialist ethics and equity, their transformation into departments of life and work, however, is not done merely by simply knowing them, by isolated and formal actions, but by consistent, scientifically organized activity with specific methods and forms. Life shows that isolated, festive-like and circumstantial actions do not have the educational effectiveness desired; such effectiveness can only be achieved by ensuring a qualitatively superior content, a continuity and diversity in strict agreement with the specific nature of each area of activity and social life. In this work of shaping man in the spirit of communist morals, special value lies in promoting a positive example.

A condition sine qua non of the effectiveness of educational activity is the creation and consolidation of a healthy collective moral-political climate, a powerful public opinion which is intransigent toward any kind of violation of the standards of socialist morals. This intransigence in turn is formed in the common effort to build the new society and for that reason it characterizes the big working collectives, steadfastly promoting correctness and combatting any form of manifestation of backward concept. The effectiveness of educational activity also does not depend merely on knowledge of certain documents, principles and standards but on carrying out diversified activity with regard to having workers understand the need for respecting the standards of socialist morals and of formation of convictions and behavior which agree with the socialist model of life. I have mentioned all this since there still are acts violating the standards of social life which reflect an insufficient level of understanding of the exigencies of social progress in Romania. Clearly, the most difficult aspect in combatting manifestations of immorality, amorality, cupidity, self seeking, egoism and so forth is not simply publicizing them or even blaming them in public but prevention of them. For this very complex moral-political and civic activity is needed. The person carrying it out must himself be a model of work and life so that he can succeed in influencing his neighbors.

The basic value of ethics and equity must be evaluated both as a principle of human relations as well as as a value which carries out justice and equality. But for us equality and justice have a deeply political determination and are based on socialist ownership of the socialist resources, on day-to-day work to increase the treasury of material and spiritual values, on striving to continually raise the material and spiritual standard of living of all the people. Equity, as a value of socialist ethics, expresses in general the relationship between the personal and general interests and the necessary balance between rights and duties.

Application of the principles and standards of the communist life and work and of socialist ethics and equity is a problem of high communist awareness, of dignity, of militant responsibility. But this awareness is not formed by itself but rather through a prolonged and winding process of education, through converging, daily efforts, through the ability of each communist and each worker to dedicate himself with passion and selflessness to the cause and ideals of the party, of society, of the people and to struggle with the difficulties still appearing in the effort at fulfillment and self-fulfillment.

The quality of life dedicated to moral education, this main demand for the stage we are going through represents a reference point and determining condition in carrying out the complicated process of the formation and development of socialist awareness. Clearly, in most locations and in the social-economic units and collectives a large number of actions are being organized with a pronouncedly moral character. But

there still are many activities of this kind which are too general, abstract, stereotyped and lacking in preciseness and militant combativeness, which do not promote effective educational solutions. There also still are people who, by failing to understand the unity of socialist awareness, neglect or underestimate the implementation of standards of socialist ethics firmly; such attitudes permit the appearance of phenomena of deviating from the standards of socialist morals.

The recent Council of State decree on preventing and combatting acts which affect good supply for the population, received with total adherence by the workers as an important normative act, also has major significance at this level: respect for the principles of socialist ethics and equity is ensured with greater firmness by punishing certain attitudes which are in total disagreement with the civic spirit of our society.

Among all the initiatives whose central point are actually the promotion and application of the principles and standards of socialist ethics and equity, the model collectives in the highest way represent the basic features of communist morals. These progressive workers' collectives, which are carrying out an express task received from the local party and state organs, take unified action to fulfill the social-economic, political-educational, general cultural, spiritual and sports goals. The model collectives circumscribe their activity around the principles and standards of communist work and life and socialist ethics and equity, in the spirit of the document documents of the party, representing through their way of thinking and acting vital nuclei of the communist style of life and work.

Harmoniously combining production work with the activity of moral-political and cultural-scientific activity changes each social-economic unit into a laboratory where the new man is formed with a broad horizon of knowledge, with a moral-political behavior worthy of the person who has assumed consciously his responsibility to create the continually more humane society.

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HISTORICAL SURVEY OF ALBANIAN SETTLEMENT IN YUGOSLAVIA

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 22 Oct 81 pp 10, 11

[Article by Viktor Meier: "A Dagger Poised To Stab Yugoslavia in the Back?-- Albanians in Kosovo Want a Republic of Their Own"]

[Text] Representatives of the Yugoslav regime rightly regard the fact that 550,000 Montenegrins are entitled to form a republic of their own in socialist Yugoslavia as evidence of tolerance and respect for conditions that have developed in the course of history. However, when almost 1.5 million Albanians in Kosovo, or close to 2 million Albanians in Yugoslavia as a whole, likewise demand the status of a republic of their own, this is regarded as "counterrevolutionary," "hostile" or an "attack on Yugoslav territorial integrity." Youngsters who daub walls with the slogan "Kosovo Republic" at night, if apprehended, have to go to prison for 2 or 3 years. This contradiction shows the great extent to which Yugoslav nationality policy has come to flounder. The country's reputation of having found pragmatic solutions of complex nationality problems appears to be a matter of the past.

There are quite solid arguments against Kosovo--which, like Voivodina, has constituted an "autonomous region" within the Republic of Serbia since 1945--being turned into an independent Yugoslav republic. One of these is consideration for Serbia and the Serbs living in Kosovo. That area constituted the center of the medieval Serbian empire. Not far from Prizren lies the mausoleum of Czar Dushan the Powerful (around 1350) devastated by the Turks. Pec is the seat of the old Serbian patriarchate with its multinaive churches. And at Kosovo Polje near Pristina there occurred, in 1389, the battle against the Turks which meant the end of the medieval Serbian realm and the beginning of Turkish rule, which was to last for centuries. The Serbs who have been in Kosovo all along, still constituting about 20 percent of the population of the region and, under pressure of Albanian nationalism, showing a tendency to emigrate, would be pushed into a difficult position. And the second, just as valid, reason is that an Albanian republic within Yugoslavia, which after all according to its name constitutes a state of South Slavs, probably would want to maintain only loose ties with the overall Yugoslav state, which under the pressure of the interests of the various republics is losing cohesion as it is. Instead relations with Albania, and thus the question of the unity of all Albanians, would soon become a question of top priority. These are things that have nothing to do with "counterrevolution." It is difficult for the regime in Belgrade openly to give the real reasons. At least for the moment, the cheap labeling of "counter-revolutionary" is simpler; the only question is how long that will so.

Like it or not, one is confronted with the question of the unity of the Albanian nation. Among Yugoslav politicians and writers who have written about Kosovo in the past few months, so far only Croatian Minister of Education Stipe Suvar, in the Belgrade journal NIN, has admitted as much. He also warned against the present "differentiation campaign" creating, on the one side, many martyrs and, on the other side--among the security forces-- "popular heroes," as during the partisan war.

Today's Kosovo Region, divided by a mountain range into Kosovo proper in the east (with Pristina and Kosovska Mitrovica) and Metohija in the West (with Prizren, Djakovica and Pec) has not always been structured that way as far as its national character is concerned. Serbian and Albanian historians agree that in Metohija--toward the west and today's Albanian border--Albanians have lived together with Serbs since the early Middle Ages, and thus also at the time of the medieval Serbian empire. In Kosovo proper, however, a Turkish economic census which has been preserved, conducted soon after the conquest of the area in the early 15th century, shows that the villages were inhabited almost exclusively by Serbs, together with some Vlachs or Arumanians. Albanian names appear only sporadically. Most local chronicles then show that roughly toward the end of the 18th century or in the early 19th century Albanians migrated into the villages from the Albanian mountain areas--in many cases being settled there by the Turkish feudal lords. Of the Serbs, a certain number moved north, into Vojvodina, after the Austrian-Turkish war of 1689-1690. The Albanian immigrants in some places assimilated to Serbian clans, particularly those who had converted to Islam. A countermovement became apparent when Kosovo became Serbian again after the First Balkan War of 1912. From then on and particularly after World War I, new Serbian settlers arrived in Kosovo. The authorities of the first Yugoslavia did everything possible to push the Albanians back. During World War II it was again Serbs and Montenegrins who had to pack their bags. Then, after 1945, came the repression of the Albanians under Minister of the Interior Rankovic, a Serb, about which the Belgrade papers are now maintaining such a stubborn silence when they ponder the causes of the revolt in Kosovo. After 1966 and particularly after the 1968 demonstrations, when a younger generation of Albanian communists assumed power in Kosovo not in name only but in actual fact, the rapid spreading of the Albanian element in public life, due both to a higher birth rate and to a strengthened nationalism, caused many Serbs and Montenegrins to emigrate. First it was those who had compromised themselves under Rankovic, then those who had been retired, and finally, to an ever-increasing extent, those who were evading hidden or open pressure. In the mixed Serbian villages the harvests of the Serbian farmers caught fire, their cattle died, or one morning an Albanian flag had been hoisted as a warning on the farm. While from 1971 to 1981 the number of Albanians in Kosovo increased by 311,000 to 1,227,000 people, that of the Serbs decreased by 18,000 to 210,000.

The origin of the Albanian people is not clear and therefore has given rise to mystifications. In his standard work "Geschichte Suedeuropas" [The History of Southeast Europe] (Vienna 1950), the German historian Georg Stadtmueller mysteriously mentions "proto-Albanian wandering shepherds" who in the Mati Mountains in today's northern Albania resisted Romanization and then, first in the 11th century, then a second time in the 13th century, and a third time in the 15th century, spread like an explosion over large parts of the Balkans. Modern Albanian historiography maintains that it can be shown that the Albanians are direct descendants of the ancient Illyrians.

Whereas a current piece put out by the TANJUG news agency directed against so-called "Albanian nationalism" makes fun of this, there are no solid grounds for rejecting this interpretation. Today's Albanian accordingly would be a language which succeeded ancient Illyrian, with Latin loan words, having bogged down in the process of Romanization, as it were. It also appears likely that the area of Albanian settlement originally was bigger than the Mati area, for it apparently has been shown that at least in part Metohija was included in it.

Later migrations, often voluntary and often the result of Turkish rule, took the Albanians not only into Kosovo but far into Greece, to islands and to the lower part of Italy. Some leaders of the Greek revolt--for example, Kondouriotis from Hydra--were Albanians as far as their language was concerned. In the central Balkans the borders of settlement were drawn by and large in the second half of the 18th century: In addition to today's Kosovo, in present Macedonia the areas of Struga, Debar, Gostivar and Tetovo were inhabited by Albanians, and in today's Montenegro the coastal town of Ulcinj and the mountain areas of Plav and Gusinj were populated by Albanians.

In the area they had settled in, the Albanians lived separated by mountains, split into clans, tribes and tribal groups and professing three religions. About 60 percent were Muslims, primarily residing in central Albania and in Kosovo. About 30 percent were Orthodox, primarily resident in south Albania and in Epirus. And 10 percent were Catholics, centered in Shkoder and in the Miridite Mountains. The Albanian language is divided into Gheg, north of the Shkumbi river, and Tosk, south of it. In the north the tribal constitution persisted, with its strict blood feud in its original form, while in the south and in today's Kosovo it melded with the Turkish feudal rule.

Under such circumstances it was hardly possible for an Albanian national consciousness to develop. In the Greek freedom struggle numerous tribes of Albanian tongue, such as the Himariotes in today's southern Albania and the Sullotes in today's Greek Epirus, fought on the side of the Greek rebels and, not least because they belonged to the Orthodox Church, felt at one with the Greek language. There also, however, existed Albanian traditions, such as the memory of the medieval hero Skenderbeg, who in the 15th century had resisted the Turks for 20 years from his fortress of Kruje north of Tirana.

In the early 19th century the Albanian area witnessed some special developments. One of them was the spreading of the Muslim Bektashi Order, and another was the evolution of semiautonomous dominions, such as that of Ali Pasha Tepelena in Ioannina or the Bushati family in Shkoder. One almost gets the impression that the togetherness of the Albanians manifested itself at that time in several parallel attempts to gain autonomy from the weakening Turkish central power, with individual tribes never having really been subjugated properly. This movement prevailed to a large extent in the decades following the success of the Greek insurrection (1827), with the Albanians' interests then apparently "saturated" for the time being.

Disruption came from outside, not from the Turks but from the Christian Balkan peoples which, as part of the development of modern nationalism, were striving to bring one piece of the Ottoman Empire after another under their control--the Greeks from the south, the Serbs and Montenegrins from the north. To this were added the aspirations of the European powers. These trends threatened to change the status quo, to restrict the area of settlement of the Albanians, to disrupt trade ties and

to create new dependencies. The Muslim Albanians were threatened to be ruled by people of a different faith, while non-Muslim Albanians, at least, faced the danger of being incorporated into national states with which they could not identify. In the struggle against these trends there developed the beginnings of a joint Albanian interest--beginnings which, under the influence of western national ideas geared primarily to common language, evolved into the beginnings of an Albanian national consciousness.

This development manifested itself for the first time in concrete terms after the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, when the Peace of San Stefano was to provide for a "Greater Bulgaria" comprising also Albanian territory in Macedonia. Thereupon the chiefs, feudal lords and other representatives of all Albanian areas assembled in Prizren in June 1878 to appeal jointly to the great powers and to prevent the ceding of Albanian territory to the new Balkan national states. This "League of Prizren" is regarded by Albanians as the beginning of their modern national movement. To-day's Kosovo Region and the neighboring areas of Debar and Tetovo, which by virtue of their geographical position were most vulnerable to actions by the new Balkan states, also displayed the greatest interest in a joint Albanian policy. It logically followed from this that Kosovo became one of the most active centers of Albanian nationalism, and this in turn explained many of the future developments.

Immediately after the events of March and April 1981, one could read official statements by Serbian communist officials according to which the League of Prizren should be judged by the fact that during World War II there existed a kind of "Second League" of Prizren in which the "fascist" notables of Kosovo had joined to fight the communist partisans. The celebrations on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the League of Prizren, one could read further, had been organized from Albania. Over and above that, the above-mentioned TANJUG piece notes disparagingly that the League of Prizren had been of no use to the Albanians anyway. It did prevent the Montenegrins for years from taking possession of the territories awarded it by the Congress of Berlin, and they even needed the support of the powers to occupy Ulcinj. One of the main concerns of the Yugoslav officials who at present are responsible for exchanging schoolbooks for the Albanians in Yugoslavia appears to be to deprecate the significance of the League of Prizren in the new books.

Yugoslav historiography has reproached the Albanians, and thus also the League of Prizren, for having allied itself with the authorities of the Ottoman Empire and advocated the continuation of Turkish rule. What they actually wanted, however, was to maintain a status quo which had guaranteed cohesion of the area of Albanian settlement and freedom of movement for its inhabitants. In light of the dim prospects of their founding an Albanian national state of their own, there hardly existed another way under the circumstances.

In the Balkan wars, precisely what the Albanians had feared and tried to prevent did in fact occur. In 1912 Serbia and Montenegro divided Kosovo between themselves, and the small independent Albania, created in November 1912 more as a result of intervention by the powers than as a result of the Albanians' own efforts, incorporated only about half of all the Albanians. The Albanians of Kosovo suddenly found themselves under the harsh rule of young Balkan national states and cut off from their usual markets. They rebelled but were beaten by force of arms. It turned out that the Albanians, who had been the last of all the Balkan peoples to adopt the modern

national area and the concept of a national state, had come off worst among all of them. From now on, in the course of their further national emancipation, the idea of a united Albanian nation, both in the cultural and in the political respect, was bound to move to the foreground of the Albanians' desires. While this was and is only natural, it just as naturally was bound to lead to conflicts with their environment.

Serbia and then, the Serbian-dominated first Yugoslavia took possession of Kosovo in the sense of retrieving the sacred places of the past which had to be purged again as much as possible of their undesirable ethnical changes. Albanian refugees from Kosovo thenceforth formed part of the picture of Tirana and other towns of independent Albania. Before long those foreign powers which aimed at expansion in the Balkans became aware of this configuration and looked on Kosovo as the second neuralgic point besides Croatia from which Yugoslavia could be unhinged. Primary among them was Fascist Italy, which first brought independent Albania under its influence and then occupied it militarily on 7 April 1939.

Only a few days after the occupation, Foreign Minister Ciano, the architect of this operation, wrote in his diary: "Talks with Stylla, our former ambassador in Belgrade. I discuss particularly the problems of the people of Kosovo--850,000 physically strong and morally staunch Albanians who view the idea of unification with their motherland with enthusiasm. It appears that the Serbs have a terrible fear of that. Today, however, one must forgo the impression that the problem is arousing our attention. On the contrary, the Yugoslavs must be lulled to sleep. But later one should embark on a policy of lively interest in Kosovo. That way an irredentist problem will be kept alive in the Balkans on which the Albanians themselves will concentrate their attention, and it will be a dagger poised to stab Yugoslavia in the back." (Diario, entry of 21 April 1939) And again, in connection with a plan to create a separate Croatia tied to Italy: "Mussolini is quite taken with the idea of smashing Yugoslavia and annexing Croatia. He considers this undertaking to be a fairly easy one, and in light of the situation I think he is right. In the meantime I propose to improve the organization of the Albanians in Kosovo, who may represent a dagger on Belgrade's flank."

The trap the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had set for itself with its treatment of its Albanians was shut in World War II. Whereas in Albania proper the resistance against the occupation increased steadily and nationalists, communists and tribal warriors alike resorted to arms, the majority of the Albanians in Kosovo and in western Macedonia felt the collapse of Yugoslavia as a liberation from foreign rule. After the defeat of Yugoslavia, Mussolini in April 1941 ordered the unification of these areas with Albania proper in a "Greater Albania," which had been the subject of such longing on the part of the Albanian nationalists. Not all Kosovo was part of it, however, and the Albanians certainly would have preferred to have attained their national goal under different circumstances. But even so the communists found it difficult to build up a partisans movement in the Albanian-populated areas.

Vukmanovic-Tempo, a former high Yugoslav communist leader, whom Tito charged with this task, wrote very candidly about this in his memoirs (Belgrade 1971). Reporting about his trip through western Macedonia in spring 1942, he says: "With the annexation of these areas to Albania, the position of the Albanian population had changed fundamentally. The power in villages and towns was in Albanian hands. In the schools,

vis-a-vis the authorities and in the street, people freely spoke Albanian. True, the real power was in the hands of the Italian occupiers, but this was not that obvious to the masses. They only saw that a lot had changed compared with the old Yugoslavia; they used to have no rights there, but now they were in charge. It was difficult to enlist this people in the struggle for a change; they were afraid that the conditions in old Yugoslavia would then return. Nor do they accept a new Yugoslavia. They find it easier to support what the occupying power did when it annexed these areas to Albania." It appears worth mentioning that now, almost 40 years later--that is, on 2 September 1981 in Kicevo--four Albanians have been sentenced to 1 1/2 years' imprisonment because they allegedly had changed their names from Macedonian into Albanian.

After the surrender of Italy on 8 September 1943, Vukmanovic-Tempo, with predominantly Macedonian units, managed to take possession of large western Macedonian areas, such as Debar and Kicevo, but immediately got entangled in national questions. He writes: "The Germans managed to win the support of the Albanians forming the majority of the population in this area. There was a danger of a fight to expand the liberated territory in the direction of Gostivar and Struga taking on the character of an accounting between Albanians and Macedonians, all the more so because the Albanians who were fighting in our forces would not have turned against fellow Albanians who were exercising power in the name of the occupiers." Vukmanovic-Tempo reports similar things from Kosovo proper. Only gradually, he says, primarily under the influence of international developments, did part of the Albanians and elements of the intelligentsia join the communist side.

What Vukmanovic-Tempo fails to say explicitly is that Kosovo at that time virtually constituted the main base of the nationalist camp among the Albanians, together with the "Balli Kombetar" (National Front) movement, which had been founded by some notables from the area of Valona. This movement fought against the Italians and then against the communists, also trying as long as possible to keep its distance from the Germans. People from Kosovo played a big role in the politics of the nationalist camp in Albania. Their role in Kosovo, like the revolt of today, displayed violence also against Serbian monuments as symbols of the Serbian claim to dominion. The monument commemorating the Battle of Kosovo Polje was destroyed, and the abbot of Decani was able to prevent the blowing up of his monastery by an Albanian squad only by secretly hurrying across the mountains to Pec and alerting the local Italian garrison. The fighting in Kosovo continued until long after the end of the war.

In Albania, in addition to international developments, it was primarily the support by the Yugoslav communists that was decisive for the victory of the communist partisans movement. But just as the Ustashe in Croatia had to buy their being installed in power by ceding Dalmatia to Italy, so Enver Hoxha was forced to abandon all claims to Kosovo as the price for Tito's support. Albanian communists who had different ideas in this matter--and there were quite a few of these--were rigorously deprived of any influence. Today the Yugoslav papers are full of bitter attacks against the regime of Enver Hoxha and against the conditions prevailing in Albania. There is no reason to doubt the truth of these Yugoslav reports, any more than there are grounds, however, to doubt the fact that these conditions probably would never have arisen if the Yugoslavs had not made their active contribution at the time. Actually, the Yugoslavs from the start strongly distrusted the intellectual Enver Hoxha and also told the Soviets so. Their man was the later Minister of the Interior Koce Dzhodze, who after 1948 was executed as a "Titoite." He was not much better,

however. The brutality with which the Albanian population was repressed in the postwar years was about the same on both sides of the border. On one side as well as the other, there was starvation as a result of the pressure against the farmers, and in both countries the authorities tried to force the Albanian population primarily to give up two things--arms and gold. Of the latter, there was quite a bit also on the Yugoslav side of the border. About Debar in Macedonia, they used to say that if the emperor's city of Istanbul were to be destroyed one day, Debar would be in a position to rebuild it.

The regime in Albania consistently continued on its course of self-isolation and repression. It has collectivized its agriculture, is keeping its standard of living low and is shutting off its population from the outside world. Through consistent mixing of the population, it is trying to destroy the old family and clan bonds, and some years ago it prohibited any religious practice. In Yugoslavia, and thus also in Kosovo, things have taken a different course. Since 1966 the Albanians in Kosovo have again been able fully to profess their Albanian nationality. The situation of the Albanians in western Macedonia has improved as well. The Autonomous Region of Kosovo has increasingly been treated as a republic of its own and has received ample development aid. Why, then, many people both in Yugoslavia and abroad wonder, did that revolt occur in spring 1981--a revolt which noncommunist Yugoslavs as well often interpret as ingratitude?

In Belgrade, people today tend to put a substantial part of the blame on alleged "subversion" by the Enver Hoxha regime in Tirana. Whoever does not embrace this thesis, in the eyes of certain Yugoslav propagandists, is a supporter of that regime and an enemy of Yugoslavia. This, however, would then also have to apply to member of the Yugoslav Presidium Stane Dolanc, who in early April before foreign correspondents stated explicitly that Tirana did not play the role of instigator. Dolanc was probably correct in saying so. Contacts between Albania and Kosovo are limited to a small intellectual segment. It was clearly the Albanians in Kosovo who took the initiative, while the regime in Tirana, with its extreme fear of contacts with abroad, went along only reluctantly. The Albanian professors who came to Pristina shut themselves off there, maintaining only slight contact with their colleagues. There is every indication that the regime in Tirana was surprised by the outbreak of the revolt in Kosovo, and it also showed itself poorly informed in the reports of its press. In the beginning Tirana clearly sought to dampen matters, and only after Belgrade had started its press campaign and after repression had begun in Kosovo, did Tirana sound a harsher tone and put out material with emphasis on national concerns. All this probably confirms again the fact Kosovo represents an independent center of an Albanian national idea and, secondly, the fact that in its self-isolation the regime in Tirana would hardly be able to take in hand such a risky business as the starting of irredentist revolts abroad which might also have repercussions at home.

Particularly vis-a-vis Western diplomats, Yugoslav circles in Belgrade try to suggest that pro-Soviet elements might assume power in Albania one day and that then Moscow as it were, would take up that "dagger poised to stab Yugoslavia in the back" which the communist partisans at the time wrested from Count Ciano's hand. Albania, these people say, "pro forma" continues to be a member of the Warsaw Pact (actually it has canceled its membership), and Bulgaria continues to adhere to a mutual assistance treaty with Albania. Apart from the fact that a great many developments are

possible not only in Tirana but also in Belgrade, such microcosmic ways of looking at things can hardly be taken at face value. The fact that Albania militarily is a vacuum is also known to NATO. As the visit by the U.S. secretary of state to Belgrade showed recently, the balance in the southeastern European area in the final analysis is likely to depend on other factors.

In Albania, incidentally, all purges of the past few years have affected people who pleaded for a prudent opening up of the country toward the West, and this mood also seems to prevail among the younger part of the apparatus. For years nothing has been heard any longer of any activity by pro-Soviet elements in Albania. With Yugoslavia, however, the present regime in Tirana is hardly like ever to want to make friends; there are too many things from the early years that are still having their effect. This, however, is rather to Belgrade's advantage, for nothing could cause Yugoslavia a greater headache in the Kosovo question than a takeover in Tirana by a reasonable democratic-nationalist regime. In that case the Kosovo question would really become serious.

Being convinced that Yugoslavia at present is not exposed to any real enmity from abroad, the regime in Belgrade apparently relies in Kosovo primarily on police repression and even military repression without giving much thought to political solutions. Even in the confrontation with the Albanians, it is giving free rein to Serbian and Macedonian nationalism; never since the end of the war have such generalizing hostile notes been sounded officially in socialist Yugoslavia against an individual national entity or nationality of the country. True, some "mistakes" have been admitted, particularly economic ones, it being stated that instead of agriculture the heavy and basic-materials industries have been promoted and that a "bureaucratic-budgetary structure" was handed too many funds for free use, and the like. But even here limits are apparent. Despite the fact that 80 percent of the population is active in private agriculture and that there does not even exist a system for buying up its produce, it is not private agriculture but primarily the socialist sector that is now to be promoted. No thought whatever is being given to promoting private crafts and services, which are being neglected in Serbia as it is. Instead of new leaders who would enjoy the confidence of the Albanian population, one has called again on the old cadres from the "administrative" period, such as party Secretary Veli Deva.

Thus Yugoslavia since April has donated almost 300 martyrs to the Albanian national cause, and since there are almost 2 million Albanians in the country, there are still great reserves left on that route. Belgrade can also continue to revile Skanderbeg and the League of Prizren, thus allowing the whole conflict to become a normal conflict of nationalities in the best Balkan tradition. The authorities of the Serbian Republic can continue to try to limit the autonomy of the Kosovo Region again and to subject it both politically and economically to the Serbian dictate. There are officials in Belgrade who are downright proud of the fact that Yugoslavia, like the progressive Occident, now has a Northern Ireland or Basque problem of its own. After a few years, if not sooner, the fruits of such a policy will be reaped. Even now Serbians under the very nose of their own police, as it were, continue to migrate from Kosovo because they are afraid.

It would be better if Yugoslavia took the opposite road and tried to make it a point decisively to put across the advantages its system can offer to the Albanians in Kosovo compared with the system in Albania. That, however, would require again respect of the Albanian nationality and, in the economy, if only to create jobs, would call for a decisive, even radical, move away from socialist dogmas. It would also require a new leadership stratum. One could definitely conceive of an Albanian national movement which seeks to realize its aims in cooperation with the multinational Yugoslav state, but in light of the way the Yugoslav leadership thinks such ideas appear utopian.



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YUGOSLAVIA

MILOVAN DJILAS CITES ENIGME THREATS AGAINST HIS SON

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 2 Nov 81 p 3

[Report by Christine von Kohl. "Milovan Djilas Anxious About His Son--A Critic's Dramatic Appeal"]

[Text] Belgrade--Milovan Djilas is concerned about the life of his 28-year-old son, Alexa, who now resides in London after having concluded his studies in philosophy in Graz, Vienna and London. Djilas has received letters from the United States, which he regards as part of an intrigue of Yugoslav intelligence, containing threats to murder his son. Djilas thinks that the recent increase in public attacks against him in Yugoslavia also indicate that he is correct in his assessment. A short time ago, for instance, Vladimir Dedijer, official reporter of Tito and the partisan war, in connection with the publication of new historical materials, called Djilas a "fanatic murderer." And on Friday [30 October] Kolj Siroka, chairman of the Socialist League of the Working People, said it was necessary for Djilas to be "deprived of the right to make antistate declarations."

A total of 9 years' imprisonment notwithstanding--to which he was sentenced by Tito's judges after 1954--Djilas has been able to publish his political views in the West fairly freely during the past 15 years while Tito was alive. Djilas does not have a passport, however. It is known that today there are circles within the party leadership who advocate a public "dialogue" with critics such as Djilas in Yugoslavia but that other circles are downright livid about the "liberties" permitted to someone like Milvan Djilas, particularly since his biography of Tito published immediately after Tito's death. Below in slightly abridged form is a statement which Djilas has transmitted to representatives of the Western press:

"On 26 April 1981 Mr George Urban telephoned me from London to tell me that he has received a letter from Chicago containing a threat to murder my son Alexa. My son would be killed unless I was prepared to 'cooperate' and--in an interview with Mr Urban--reveal all 'secrets' about the murder of Serbs by the communist animals.' The deadline of 31 December of this year was given. The letter also contained a threat against Mr Urban--in the event the contents of the letter should become known to the Yugoslav secret police....

Mr Urban told me that he had sent me a copy of said letter 5 or 6 days earlier, but I did not receive the letter until the following day, despite the fact that airmail from Great Britain normally does not take that long.

The letter, postmarked Chicago, which Mr Urban had transmitted to me in fact contained what he had told me on the telephone. In addition (Mr Urban was so tactful as not to mention it on the phone) it contained the twaddle about my having 'participated' in crimes with which I was totally unfamiliar. In my public memoirs I reported all that I know about the good and the bad things I did in my revolutionary communist past.

Not for that reason, though, not to purge myself, but rather as a father, I find it appropriate, albeit reluctantly, to step before the public abroad.

Why, and why at this particular time, are such letters, such threats delivered? And why in particular against my son? I am not sure about everything, nor can I be, and therefore I cannot give a complete answer.

But the following facts are significant: The request addressed to me in the mentioned letter to cooperate with emigres and reveal 'communist crimes' would at least provide a pretense for preferring charges against me if I write what I think and what I know from my time.

I consider that to be of minor importance, however. It is not by chance that threats are being voiced against my son at this particular moment, because since last year he has critically analyzed the situation in Yugoslavia in political articles in London which have been published in a number of foreign journals.

It is not by chance that my son is being threatened immediately after top Yugoslav officials (Dolanc, Bilic) have attacked publicly him as a 'Chetnik' and 'emigre'--despite the fact that he is 28 years old, completed his military service in Yugoslavia about 1½ years ago and has a Yugoslav passport. Nor is it a coincidence that an article attacking terrorism (VJESNIK of 3 October) mentions my son--in order to make the public more amenable to a crime against my son!

The emigres, without any doubt at all, include murky and irresponsible figures. The critical writings by my son, however, assuredly are apt to disturb such people much less than the Yugoslav regime and its political offices.

I repeat: My son is not a member of any public or secret organization. He does not advocate any kind of extremist ideas or violent methods; my son professes democratic ideas and supports peaceful methods. Undemocratic discrimination and pressures he has experienced since he was a child have shown him the way to freedom--to critical analysis of undemocratic phenomena.

Any father could be proud of a son like mine, and that is one of the reasons why I want to inform the public about the threats against him--threats based on alleged guilt on his father's part!"

(Signed) Milovan Djilas, Belgrade, 17 October 1981.

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END

END OF

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DATE FILMED

Nov. 27, 1981